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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Brian Copenhaver, who was convicted of violating 18 
U.S.C. S 1951 (interference with commerce by robbery) and 
18 U.S.C. S 2113(d) (armed bank robbery), appeals from the 
judgment of conviction and sentence, limiting his appeal to 
the District Court's imposition of the two-point offense level 
enhancement for physical restraint of the victim. Although 
this issue has been considered by other courts of appeals, 
it is one of first impression in this circuit. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On April 13, 1997, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 
Copenhaver and co-defendant James Keplinger robbed the 
Historic Strasburg Inn in Strasburg, Pennsylvania. Night 
auditor Thomas Helwig was in the inn lobby. Copenhaver 
pointed what appeared to be an automatic pistol at Helwig 
and stated, "your luck has just run out, faggot." App. at 41. 
The weapon was actually a BB gun, but that fact is not 
significant for our purposes. Copenhaver jumped over the 
counter and struck Helwig on the head with the pistol, 
which caused a laceration on the top of Helwig's scalp. 
Copenhaver told Helwig to go into the adjoining office area 
and kneel down by the photocopy machine. Copenhaver 
then tried to open the cash register but after he was unable 
to do so, he and Keplinger forced Helwig to open the cash 
register. The robbers obtained $435 from the cash register 
and another $150 from a money bag behind the Inn's bar. 
They then forced Helwig into another office, and, according 
to the presentence investigation report which provides the 
only basis for the relevant factual record, "put him in the 
fireplace and placed the fire screen across it." During the 
course of the robbery, Copenhaver repeatedly threatened 
Helwig, using terms such as "I want to waste you, faggot," 
and "I'm going to waste you faggot." App. at 42. Helwig 
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remained in the fireplace for fifteen to thirty minutes after 
the robbers left and then called the police. 
 
Less than a month later, on May 9, 1997, Copenhaver, 
Keplinger, and another man drove in a stolen vehicle to the 
Farmers' First Bank, a federally-insured financial 
institution located in Peach Bottom, Pennsylvania. 
Copenhaver, dressed in a costume intended to resemble the 
clothing worn by Amish men, entered the bank carrying 
what appeared to the bank employees to be a 
semiautomatic pistol but which was actually his BB gun. 
Copenhaver instructed those present to put their hands up 
and told the tellers to give him all the money. As 
Copenhaver was leaving the bank, he dropped some of the 
money on the floor of the bank. Copenhaver left with a total 
of $8,817 in cash. 
 
Copenhaver was indicted by a federal grand jury on four 
counts arising from the robbery of the Farmers' First Bank: 
conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 371, armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(d), possession of a stolen vehicle that had crossed 
state lines after being stolen in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2313, and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2. On the same day, the grand jury returned another 
indictment charging Copenhaver with interference with 
commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1951, 
arising from the robbery of the Historic Strasburg Inn. The 
two prosecutions were consolidated for plea and sentencing. 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, 
Copenhaver pled guilty to one count of interference with 
interstate commerce by robbery and one count of armed 
bank robbery. In exchange for those pleas of guilty, the 
government sought and obtained dismissal of the 
conspiracy and possession of stolen vehicle charges. In 
their negotiations with respect to the applicable sentencing 
guidelines, Copenhaver and the government disagreed on 
the applicability of the two-level enhancement for "physical 
restraint" provided in U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) in 
connection with the robbery of the Historic Strasburg Inn. 
The Probation Officer issued a revised presentence report 
that recommended such enhancement. 
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The District Court held a sentencing hearing at which the 
principal contested issue was whether Copenhaver had 
"physically restrained" a victim within the meaning of the 
Sentencing Guidelines during the robbery of the Historic 
Strasburg Inn. After discussing various cases from other 
circuits the District Court stated: 
 
       So while the Third Circuit has not squarely addressed 
       the two-point enhancement, there is ample authority 
       and all going in one direction which would hold that 
       the enhancement is appropriate in this case, where the 
       defendant and his co-defendant . . . were armed with a 
       BB gun and that it appeared to be a semiautomatic 
       pistol when they robbed the inn and where the victim 
       was struck with a gun, was forced to his knees, made 
       to crouch in the fireplace and then placed thefireplace 
       screen -- and where the fireplace screen was placed 
       across the opening. 
 
       These actions clearly qualify as a physical restraint of 
       the victim and for that reason, the enhancement is 
       appropriate. 
 
App. at 111-12. 
 
The District Court therefore applied the two-level 
enhancement for "physical restraint" of the victim. This 
resulted in an adjusted offense level of 27 which, when 
combined with Copenhaver's criminal history, led to a 
guidelines range of 120 to 150 months imprisonment. The 
District Court sentenced Copenhaver to 120 months 
imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a 
special assessment of $200. Copenhaver timely appealed 
the sentence. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The sole issue on appeal is whether Copenhaver's actions 
during the Historic Strasburg Inn robbery constitute 
"physical restraint" within the meaning of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. We have not addressed this issue. We therefore 
review the decisions of other courts of appeals that have 
 
                                4 
  
considered the scope of "physical restraint" in analogous 
situations. 
 
Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
provides for a two-level increase "if any person was 
physically restrained to facilitate commission of the 
offense." Section 1B1.1, to which application note 1 of 
section 2B3.1 refers, provides that "physically restrained 
means the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being 
tied, bound or locked up." 
 
Cases have generally held that "[p]hysical restraint" is not 
limited to the examples listed in the guidelines. As one 
court explained, "[t]he use of the modifier`such as' in the 
definition indicates that the illustration of the`physical 
restraint' are listed by way of example rather than 
limitation." United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1518 
(11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 320-21 (2nd Cir. 
1993); United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Stokely, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
 
Enhancement for "physical restraint" has been held 
applicable when the defendant "creates circumstances 
allowing the persons no alternative but compliance." United 
States v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1993); see 
also United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 
1997); Jones, 32 F.2d at 1519; Doubet, 969 F.2d at 347. A 
defendant "physically restrains" his victims if he uses force 
to impede others from interfering with the commission of 
the offense. See United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 
1329 (10th Cir. 1997); Rosario, 7 F.3d at 321; Doubet, 969 
F.2d at 347. 
 
The Doubet case provides a close factual parallel to the 
case at bar. In Doubet, the defendant herded victims into 
an unlocked restroom in the back of a bank while pointing 
a sawed off shotgun at them, yelling death threats, and 
admonishing that an armed accomplice stood guard 
(although there was no actual accomplice). 969 F.2d at 
347. The district court applied the physical restraint 
enhancement, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed, noting that the purpose of the 
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enhancement is to punish criminals who use physical 
restraint to "facilitate the commission of the offense." Id. at 
346. The court opined that "force" is not limited to physical 
force and may encompass other circumstances that permit 
no alternative to compliance. Id. at 347. Although the court 
mentioned that herding victims into a defined area does not 
necessarily constitute "physical restraint," it nevertheless 
held that the victims in that case were for all intents and 
purposes confined to the restroom, albeit unlocked, 
because the "illusory accomplice," along with the 
defendant's actions, "served as a figurative lock and key 
sufficient to constitute a physical restraint which facilitated 
the commission of the offense." Id. 
 
In Kirtley, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
held that a defendant who entered a bank displaying a gun 
and ordered the tellers to bind themselves with materials 
he provided had physically restrained them. 986 F.2d at 
285. The court rejected the contention that the tellers were 
not physically restrained because they were able to free 
themselves after the defendant left the bank. Id. at 285. 
 
The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this 
issue have employed similar reasoning. For example, in 
Jones the court held "physical restraint" was present when 
armed robbers, in order to facilitate the robbery, forced 
persons in a credit union into the safe room and ordered 
them to lie face down, thereby restricting the victims' 
mobility and capacity to observe events. 32 F.3d at 1512, 
1519. Similarly, in United States v. Schau, 1 F.3d 729, 730 
(8th Cir. 1993), the court held that armed defendants who 
ordered their victims into a bank vault had restrained their 
victims for purposes of U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), even 
though the defendants were unable to lock the vault's door. 
Presented with somewhat different facts, the court in United 
States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993), held 
that a defendant who pointed a weapon (later found to be 
a hairbrush) and who ordered his victims to move about 
had physically restrained them. See also Fisher, 132 F.3d 
at 1327 (physical restraint occurred when one defendant 
"kept the security guard at bay by pointing gun at his head 
while two others looted the teller counter"); Robinson, 20 
F.3d 270, 279 (spraying of mace effected physical restraint 
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because it impeded the victim's movement and prevented 
the victim from chasing after the robber); Rosario, 7 F.3d 
319, 320-321 (enhancement applied to a defendant who 
stood on victim's neck to facilitate robbery). 
 
Copenhaver argues that the two-level enhancement is not 
applicable because the Guidelines' definition of"physically 
restrained" requires an exertion of physical force upon the 
victim. He relies on United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154 
(2nd Cir. 1999), a recent opinion of the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, decided after the District Court issued 
its ruling on this issue. In Anglin, the defendant bank 
robber brandished a gun and ordered the bank tellers to 
get down on the floor and not to move. The appellate court 
held that "displaying a gun and telling people to get down 
and not move, without more, is insufficient to trigger the 
`physical restraint' enhancement." Id. at 164. The court 
stated that "[s]uch conduct is materially different from the 
Guidelines examples, each of which involves a restraint of 
movement by use of some artifact by which the victim is 
`tied' or `bound' . . . or by the use of a space where the 
victim is `locked up,' as in the cited cases from other 
circuits." Id. The court also stated that the Application Note 
examples, although not imposing limitations upon the 
phrase "physical restraint", are intended as meaningful 
signposts on the way to understanding the Sentencing 
Commission's enhancement purpose. Id. 
 
In this respect, the Anglin court differed from the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Thompson, 
which held that a defendant who had ordered his victim to 
move about in a certain direction had physically restrained 
the victim. See 109 F.3d at 641. The Thompson court 
stated, "[w]hen a dangerous weapon is used to force a 
person to move about, that person has been physically 
restrained just as surely as if he was grabbed by the collar 
and pulled along. In fact, he may be even more restrained." 
Id. at 641. 
 
Copenhaver not unexpectedly sides with Anglin. He 
argues that his actions directing Helwig to stand in the 
fireplace are not within the scope of the physical restraint 
enhancement because the victim was not "tied," "bound," or 
"locked up" but was merely placed behind an easily 
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moveable and see-through fireplace screen. He argues that 
although Helwig remained in the fireplace forfifteen to 
thirty minutes after he and his confederate left, Helwig did 
so solely based on fear. 
 
We need not choose in this case between the position of 
Thompson that forcing some action at the point of a gun 
constitutes physical restraint under the Guideline and that 
in Anglin holding to the contrary. Here, Copenhaver did 
more than merely order Helwig to stand still, kneel or lie 
down. He not only forced him into another office but put 
him into the fireplace and placed the fire screen across it, 
thereby confining his victim in a manner comparable to the 
example given in Anglin of "lock[ing] up" the victim. 
 
Copenhaver, noting that the presentence report does not 
actually state that he made Helwig move at gunpoint from 
one location of the Inn to another or that he uttered any 
threats at the time when he ordered Helwig into the 
fireplace, argues there was no basis to find the required 
physical restraint. We are not persuaded. No actual 
touching is required to effect physical restraint. See, e.g., 
Thompson, 109 F.3d at 641(noting that the example "locked 
up" in the application note supports the notion that no 
touching is required); Doubet, 969 F.2d at 347 (" `Force' is 
not limited to physical force, but may also encompass the 
operation of circumstances that permit no alternative to 
compliance." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Whether or not Copenhaver threatened Helwig at the 
moment he "forced" him into the other office, he had 
previously displayed a gun and repeatedly uttered phrases 
such as "I want to waste you faggot." The use of the 
unchallenged word "forced" in the presentence report 
connotes physical restraint. Most significantly, Copenhaver 
placed a screen in front of the fireplace. There was no 
reason to do so other than to signify his intention to impede 
Helwig from intervening with the commission of the crime 
and deter his prompt call for help. For all intents and 
purposes, Helwig was confined to the fireplace and had no 
alternative but compliance. 
 
The size of the fireplace, the opacity of the screen, and 
the weight of the screen - all matters that are not of record 
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- are not dispositive. Although it is of record that the screen 
was easily removable, the fact that a barrier was not 
impenetrable does not negate physical restraint. In Doubet, 
the restroom in which the victims were placed was 
unlocked, see Doubet, 969 F.2d at 346, in Jones the 
saferoom of the credit union where the employees and 
customers were told to lie down was unlocked, 32 F.3d at 
519, and in Kirtley, even though the tellers' feet were tied, 
the tellers were easily able to unfasten their bonds. It is the 
perpetrator's act of enclosing or confining the victim in a 
space or with a barrier, actual or threatened, that 
constitutes the action meriting enhancement of the offense 
level. There was ample basis for the District Court to find 
that occurred in this case. Therefore, Copenhaver 
"physically restrained" his victim, and the enhancement 
was warranted. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
sentence, which includes the two-level enhancement for 
"physical restraint" of the victim. 
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